

FORMAL PROOF SYSTEMS FOR PROGRAM EQUIVALENCE

J.A. Bergstra	J.W. Klop
Department of Computer Science	Department of Computer Science
University of Leiden	Mathematical Centre
Wassenaarseweg 80	Kruislaan 413
2300 RA Leiden	1098 SJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands	The Netherlands

We explore conservative refinements of specifications. These form an appropriate framework for a proof theory for program equivalence that is based on a logic for partial program correctness.

We propose two formalized proof methods for program equivalence (inclusion). Both are sound w.r.t. the most general semantics of first order specifications. In spite of being incomplete the methods cover many natural examples.

0. INTRODUCTION

This paper aims at a detailed study of program equivalence, seen from the point of view of Hoare's logic for program correctness. Because program inclusion is just halfway program equivalence we can safely restrict our attention to program inclusion. This moreover has the advantage of connecting closely to the theory of programming using stepwise refinements as described in BACK [2].

Our work can be seen as belonging to the subject of axiomatic semantics for programs. Its novelty lies in the precise mathematical analysis of the situation, in addition to a rather strict adherence to first order proof systems and first order semantics for data type specifications.

Deriving program equivalence from program correctness properties is not a new idea, of course. It occurs in compiler correctness proofs, for instance HEMERIK [12], and RUSSELL [16], as well as in the general theory of program correctness as in HAREL, PNUELI & STAVI [11], COUSINEAU - ENJALBERT [9].

Because of our interest in a proper theoretical analysis, we try to minimize the semantical problems by working with while-programs only; this by no means trivializes the problem. We expect that the present theory can be generalized to more powerful programming concepts, although not without some effort.

It appears to us to be a worth-while but nontrivial project to relate our proof systems to the methods of algebraic semantics, as explained e.g. in GUESSARIAN [10].

One might expect a close relationship between the present work and MEYER-HALPERN [14], which also describes program equivalence from the point of view of first order logic. It is an important difference however that their paper focuses on semantics, whereas our main interest is in proof systems.

In the sequel of this introduction an intuitive account is given of the key definitions that underly the paper.

Intuition. Suppose that for $S_1, S_2 \in WP(\Sigma)$ we have

$$(1) \quad \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \quad (\text{semantical inclusion})$$

and that we wish to prove this fact. Now obviously, (1) implies

$$(2) \quad \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S_2\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S_1\{q\}, \text{ for all } p, q \in L(\Sigma).$$

However, there is no reason to expect that the reverse implication (2) \Rightarrow (1) will hold, since (2) states only roughly that $S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$, where 'roughly' refers to the limited expressive power of $L(\Sigma)$. (In fact, one can show that indeed (2) \neq (1).) Now consider

$$(3) \quad \forall (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \quad \forall p, q \in L(\Sigma') \\ \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') \models \{p\}S_2\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') \models \{p\}S_1\{q\}.$$

Clearly (1) \Rightarrow (3) \Rightarrow (2). (For (1) \Rightarrow (3), note that if $(\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T)$, then the reducts of (Σ', T') -algebras to Σ form a subset of $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$; hence $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \Rightarrow \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$.)

In fact we will restrict our attention to a subclass of all refinements (\geq) of (Σ, T) , namely to the *conservative* refinements (\geq) of (Σ, T) , for reasons which will be clear later. So consider

$$(4) \quad \forall (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \quad \forall p, q \in L(\Sigma') \\ \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') \models \{p\}S_2\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') \models \{p\}S_1\{q\}.$$

Now we have (1) \Rightarrow (3) \Rightarrow (4) \Rightarrow (2); and it can be shown that (4) \Rightarrow (1). The conclusion is that one can treat the 'semantical' inclusion (1) by considering only first order properties of S_1, S_2 (i.e. asserted programs $\{p\}S_i\{q\}$, $i = 1, 2$), provided one is willing to consider not only (Σ, T) , but all its (conservative) refinements.

This observation prepares the way for an approach via Hoare's logic of proving asserted programs. First of all, define

$$(5) \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)} S_2 \text{ iff } \forall p, q \in L(\Sigma) \\ \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S_2\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S_1\{q\} \\ \text{(prooftheoretical inclusion)}$$

and consider

$$(6) \quad \forall (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma', T')} S_2 \quad \text{(derivable inclusion)}$$

the prooftheoretical analogue of (4). Indeed, it will turn out that this 'derivable' inclusion, written as $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$, implies the semantical inclusion (1). This is our first "proof system" for proving semantical inclusion; we will prove that (6), as a relation of S_1, S_2 , is semi-decidable in T .

Of course the proof system given by (6) is sound, i.e. (6) \Rightarrow (1); otherwise it did not deserve the name. Some simple program inclusions that are in its scope, are program equivalences like 'loop-unwinding', and the kind of program equivalences considered in MANNA [13]. This proof system is not yet complete, however. In order to prove semantical inclusion (1), it is sufficient that:

$$(7) \quad \exists (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \quad \forall (\Sigma'', T'') \geq (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2.$$


(Notation: $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$, in words: *forced inclusion*.)

The proof system embodied by (7) is stronger than that of derivable inclusion (6), and we will give an example of program inclusion which requires the extra strength of this last proof system.

Still, (7) is not 'complete'. One can prove, however, that the following 'cofinal' inclusion is equivalent to semantical inclusion:

$$(8) \quad \forall (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists (\Sigma'', T'') \geq (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2.$$

One could suspect that there is a multitude of such relations obtained by repeated alternating quantification $\forall\exists\forall\dots$ from the basic relation $\sqsubseteq_{HL}(\Sigma, T)$ (prooftheoretical inclusion). It is a pleasant surprise, suggesting the naturalness of the notions involved, that this possible hierarchy does in fact not exist, and that one has no more relations than in the following diagram:



1. PRELIMINARIES ABOUT PROGRAMS AND LOGIC

The notions of first order language, derivability (\vdash) and satisfiability (\models) are supposed known.

In this paper we will exclusively deal with while-programs. For a signature Σ the set $WP(\Sigma)$ of while-programs over Σ is defined inductively as follows:

$$S ::= x := t \mid S_1; S_2 \mid \text{if } b \text{ then } S_1 \text{ else } S_2 \text{ fi} \mid \text{while } b \text{ do } S \text{ od},$$

where $t \in \text{Ter}(\Sigma)$, the set of terms over the signature Σ , b is a boolean (i.e. quantifier free) assertion $\in L(\Sigma)$, the first order language determined by Σ .

A *specification* is a pair (Σ, T) where $T \in L(\Sigma)$; the semantics of a specification is just the collection $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$ of Σ -structures A such that $A \models T$. We write $\text{Alg}(\Sigma)$ for $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, \emptyset)$.

$A, B \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$ will be written as $A = (A, \dots)$, $B = (B, \dots)$ where A, B are the underlying sets.

For $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma)$ and $S \in WP(\Sigma)$ with variables x_1, \dots, x_k the meaning of S in A is a partial function $M_A(S): A^k \rightarrow A^k$. $M_A(S)$ can be defined using conventional methods of operational or denotational semantics.

We write $S(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$ for $M_A(S)(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$; if $S(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$ for some \vec{b} we write $S(\vec{a}) \dagger$ (otherwise $S(\vec{a}) \uparrow$).

Important is the following

1.1. COMPUTATION LEMMA. Let $\vec{x} = x_1, \dots, x_k$ and $\vec{y} = y_1, \dots, y_k$. Let $S = S(\vec{x}) \in WP(\Sigma)$ (i.e. S contains precisely the variables \vec{x}). Then for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there is a quantifier free assertion $\text{Comp}_{S,n}(\vec{x}) = \vec{y}$ in $L(\Sigma)$ such that for every $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma)$ and all $\vec{a}, \vec{b} \in A$:

$$A \models \text{Comp}_{S,n}(\vec{a}) = \vec{b} \iff |\vec{S}(\vec{a})| \leq n \text{ and } S(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}.$$

Here \vec{a}, \vec{b} are constant symbols denoting \vec{a}, \vec{b} and $|\vec{S}(\vec{a})|$ denotes the length of the

computation of S on \vec{a} .

1.2. Preliminaries on Hoare's logic.

Let $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in WP(\Sigma)$. Then the syntactic object $\{p\}S\{q\}$ is called an 'asserted program'. For $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma)$, we define:

$$A \models \{p\}S\{q\} \text{ iff } \forall \vec{a}, \vec{b} \in A: S(\vec{a}) \downarrow \text{ and } S(\vec{a}) = \vec{b} \Rightarrow (A \models p(\vec{a}) \rightarrow q(\vec{b})).$$

Furthermore we define

$$\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S\{q\} \iff \forall A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) A \models \{p\}S\{q\}.$$

Hoare's logic w.r.t. (Σ, T) is a well-known proof system designed to prove facts like $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S\{q\}$. We will call this proof system $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)$; it provides one axiom (assignment axiom) and four rules:

- (1) Assignment axiom scheme: $\{p[t/x]\} \quad x:=t \quad \{p\}$
- (2) Composition rule:
$$\frac{\{p\}S_1\{r\} \quad \{r\}S_2\{q\}}{\{p\}S_1;S_2\{q\}}$$
- (3) Conditional rule:
$$\frac{\{p \wedge b\}S_1\{q\} \quad \{p \wedge \neg b\}S_2\{q\}}{\{p\} \text{ if } b \text{ then } S_1 \text{ else } S_2 \text{ fi } \{q\}}$$
- (4) Iteration rule:
$$\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S \{p\}}{\{p\} \text{ while } b \text{ do } S \text{ od } \{p \wedge \neg b\}}$$
- (5) Consequence rule:
$$\frac{p \rightarrow p_1 \quad \{p_1\}S\{q_1\} \quad q_1 \rightarrow q}{\{p\}S\{q\}}$$

where $(\Sigma, T) \vdash p \rightarrow p_1$ and $(\Sigma, T) \vdash q_1 \rightarrow q$.

These rules constitute an inductive definition of a relation $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S\{q\}$; we assume familiarity with this proof system.

$\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)$ is sound in the following sense: for all $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in WP(\Sigma)$: $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S\{q\}$.

1.2.1. DEFINITION. $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)$ is *logically complete* iff for all $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in WP(\Sigma)$: $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S\{q\} \iff \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models \{p\}S\{q\}$.

(In general, $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)$ is not logically complete. The notion of logical completeness is studied in BERGSTRÄ-TUCKER [6].)

2. REFINEMENTS OF SPECIFICATIONS

In this section we will collect some facts concerning the notion of *refinement* and especially, *conservative refinement*. These notions will be of fundamental importance in the sequel. All the material in this section is standard in Mathematical Logic and can be found (e.g.) in SHOENFIELD [17] and MONK [15].

2.1. DEFINITION (refinements)

(i) If $\Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma$ and $T' \supseteq T$ we write $(\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T)$ and call (Σ', T') a *refinement* of (Σ, T) . Here $T = \{p \in L(\Sigma) \mid T \vdash p\}$.

We will always suppose that T, T' are consistent.

(ii) Let A be some algebra. Then Σ_A is the *signature* of A and T_A is the *theory* of A : $T_A = \{p \in L(\Sigma_A) \mid A \models p\}$.

Note that $A \models p \iff \text{Alg}(\Sigma_A, T_A) \models p$.

(iii) Let (Σ, T) be a specification. Then T is *complete* if $\forall p \in L(\Sigma), T \vdash p$ or $T \vdash \neg p$.

2.2. DEFINITION (conservative refinements)

Let $(\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T)$ be a refinement such that: $\forall p \in L(\Sigma) T' \vdash p \iff T \vdash p$. In other words, such that $\overline{T'} \cap L(\Sigma) = \overline{T}$. Then this refinement is called *conservative* over (Σ, T) .

(So a conservative refinement does not yield more theorems in the 'original' language $L(\Sigma)$.)

Notation: $(\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T)$.

2.2.1. Note that if T is complete: $(\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T) \iff (\Sigma', T') \geq (\Sigma, T)$.

2.3. DEFINITION. (Expansions and restrictions). Let $\Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma$.


(i) If (Σ', T') is a specification, then the *restriction* of (Σ', T') to the signature Σ is (Σ, T) where $T = T' \cap L(\Sigma)$.

(ii) If $A' \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T')$, then the *restriction* of A' to Σ is obtained by deleting all constants, functions, predicates in A' corresponding to symbols in $\Sigma' - \Sigma$. The resulting A is also called a *reduct* of A' ; and A' is called an *expansion* of A . We will also write $A \leq A'$.

2.3.1. Note that if $A' \geq A$, then $(\Sigma_{A'}, T_{A'}) \geq (\Sigma_A, T_A)$.

In the sequel we will always deal with conservative refinements (\geq). They have the pleasant property that two refinements $(\Sigma_i, T_i) \geq (\Sigma, T)$ ($i = 1, 2$) can be joined to a refinement $(\Sigma_1 \cup \Sigma_2, T_1 \cup T_2) \geq (\Sigma, T)$, provided the requirement $\Sigma_1 \cap \Sigma_2 = \Sigma$ is satisfied. This is a (strong) form of A. Robinson's Consistency Theorem (RCT).

2.4. ROBINSON'S CONSISTENCY THEOREM.



Let $(\Sigma_i, T_i) \geq (\Sigma_0, T_0)$, $i = 1, 2$, such that $\Sigma_1 \cap \Sigma_2 = \Sigma_0$. Then

(i) $T_1 \cup T_2$ is consistent, and moreover

(ii) $(\Sigma_1 \cup \Sigma_2, T_1 \cup T_2) \geq (\Sigma_0, T_0)$.

PROOF. See Exercise 22.15 p.375 MONK [15] or BOOLOS - JEFFREY [8] p.244. \square

We conclude this section with a useful criterion for conservativity.

2.5. DEFINITION. Let (Σ', T') be a refinement such that every $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$ can be expanded to an $A' \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T')$. Then this refinement is called *simple*.

2.6. PROPOSITION. (Criterion for conservativity). *Simple refinements are conservative.*

PROOF. Suppose (Σ', T') is a simple refinement of (Σ, T) , i.e. $\forall A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \exists A' \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T') A' \geq A$. Let $T \not\vdash p$ for some closed assertion p . Then by Gödel's Completeness Theorem, $A \not\vdash p$ for some $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$. So there is an $A' \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma', T')$ such that $A' \geq A$. Hence $A' \models \neg p$; and reasoning backwards we have $T' \not\vdash p$. \square

3. PROGRAM INCLUSIONS

We will now introduce the various notions of inclusion (\sqsubseteq) between programs $S_1, S_2 \in \text{WP}(\Sigma)$ which we will study, and prove some important facts about them.

Let $S \in \text{WP}(\Sigma)$ and $A = (A, \dots) \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$. Let S contain the variables x_1, \dots, x_n ($n \geq 1$). Then $M_A(S): A^n \rightarrow A^n$ is the partial function defined in Section 1.

3.1. DEFINITION. Let $S_1, S_2 \in \text{WP}(\Sigma)$.

(i) *Semantical inclusion*:

$$\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \iff M_A(S_1) \subseteq M_A(S_2), \text{ for all } A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T).$$

(ii) *Prooftheoretical inclusion*:

$$S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma, T)} S_2 \text{ iff for all } p, q \in L(\Sigma): \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S_2\{q\} \Rightarrow \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S_1\{q\}.$$

(iii) *Derivable inclusion*:

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \iff \forall (\Sigma', T') \triangleright (\Sigma, T) \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma', T')} S_2.$$

(iv) *Forced inclusion*:

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \iff \exists (\Sigma', T') \triangleright (\Sigma, T) \quad \text{HL}(\Sigma', T') \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2.$$

(v) *Cofinal inclusion*: the inclusion $S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ is *cofinal*, if

$$\forall (\Sigma', T') \triangleright (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists (\Sigma'', T'') \triangleright (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2.$$

3.2. REMARK. (i) Note the direction of the implication in 3.1 (ii). Intuitively: S_1 is less defined than S_2 , so $\{p\}S_1\{q\}$ is more often trivially true.

(ii) The phrase 'derivable' in 3.1 (iii) and the choice of the notation ' \vdash ' is justified by results in Section 5: it will be proved that derivable inclusion w.r.t. (Σ, T) is semi-decidable in T .

(iii) In all cases 3.1(i) - (v) there is the corresponding notion of equivalence, defined in the obvious way; e.g. for forced equivalence:

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_1 \equiv S_2 \iff \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \text{ and } \text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_2 \sqsubseteq S_1.$$

It is clear that all inclusions (\sqsubseteq) defined above are partial orders and that all equivalences (\equiv) are equivalence relations, except for forced and cofinal inclusion resp. equivalence. For the last case, 'cofinal', we will prove in Section 5 that cofinal inclusion coincides with semantical inclusion, hence cofinal inclusion is indeed transitive.

3.3. PROPOSITION. *Forced inclusion is transitive. (Hence it is a partial order and forced equivalence is an equivalence relation.)*

PROOF. Let $S_1, S_2, S_3 \in \text{WP}(\Sigma)$, $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ and $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_2 \sqsubseteq S_3$. Then for $i = 1, 2$:

$$\exists (\Sigma'_i, T'_i) \triangleright (\Sigma, T) \quad \forall (\Sigma''_i, T''_i) \triangleright (\Sigma'_i, T'_i) \quad S_i \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma''_i, T''_i)} S_{i+1}.$$

Now consider such (Σ'_i, T'_i) , $i = 1, 2$. We may suppose that $\Sigma'_1 \cap \Sigma'_2 = \Sigma$. Now by Robinson's Consistency Theorem 2.4,

$$(\Sigma^*, T^*) = (\Sigma'_1 \cup \Sigma'_2, T'_1 \cup T'_2) \triangleright (\Sigma, T).$$

Evidently, $\text{HL}(\Sigma^*, T^*) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ and $\text{HL}(\Sigma^*, T^*) \vdash S_2 \sqsubseteq S_3$. By transitivity of derivable inclusion, therefore $\text{HL}(\Sigma^*, T^*) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_3$. Hence $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \Vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_3$. \square

The main result of this section consists in establishing the various logical interrelationships between the previously defined notions of inclusion (and equivalence), as they are displayed in the diagram in the Introduction. There are only three non-trivial cases and two of them are dealt with in the following proposition.

3.4. PROPOSITION. (i) *Forced inclusion implies cofinal inclusion.*

(ii) *Semantical inclusion implies cofinal inclusion.*
 (See Proposition (5.1) for the other direction.)

PROOF. (i) Suppose $HL(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$, i.e.:

$$(1) \quad \exists(\Sigma', T') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma, T) \quad \forall(\Sigma'', T'') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2$$

To prove:

$$(2) \quad \forall(\Sigma'_1, T'_1) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists(\Sigma''_1, T''_1) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma'_1, T'_1) \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma''_1, T''_1)} S_2$$

Take (Σ', T') as in (1), and consider a (Σ'_1, T'_1) as in (2).
 We may assume that $\Sigma' \cap \Sigma'_1 = \Sigma$. Then take (Σ''_1, T''_1) in (2) as the union of (Σ'_1, T'_1)
 and (Σ', T') ; by RCT 2.4 this is possible.

(ii) To prove: $Alg(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \Rightarrow$

$$\forall(\Sigma', T') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists(\Sigma'', T'') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2.$$

Suppose $Alg(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$, and consider $(\Sigma', T') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma, T)$.
 According to BERGSTRA-TUCKER [7] there is a $(\Sigma'', T'') \sqsupseteq (\Sigma', T')$ for which HL is
 logically complete (See Def. 1.2.1).
 Consequently: $S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2$. \square

3.5. REMARK. All inclusions introduced above, except semantical inclusion, were
 obtained by quantification over the 'basic' prooftheoretical inclusion \sqsubseteq_{HL} . This
 suggests looking at all inclusions of the following general form:

$$S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}^{\forall \exists \forall \dots \exists} S_2 \iff \forall(\Sigma_1, T_1) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists(\Sigma_2, T_2) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma_1, T_1) \\ \forall(\Sigma_3, T_3) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma_2, T_2) \dots \exists(\Sigma_{2n}, T_{2n}) \sqsupseteq (\Sigma_{2n-1}, T_{2n-1}) \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma_{2n}, T_{2n})} S_2,$$

and likewise $S_1 \sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}^{\forall \exists \forall \dots \forall} S_2$, and the dual notions obtained by interchanging \exists, A .

(Note that only alternating strings of quantifiers are interesting, since clearly
 $\forall \forall \forall \dots = \forall \forall \dots$ and likewise for \exists .) So derivable inclusion w.r.t. (Σ, T) is
 $\sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}$, forced inclusion is $\sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}^{\forall}$, and cofinal inclusion is $\sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}^{\exists}$. (Inclu-
 sion in some refinement, $\sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)}^{\exists}$, was not mentioned in this Section, because it
 seems to be of less importance.)

Now it is easy to show (using RCT 2.4) that (dropping the subscript
 $HL(\Sigma, T)$) $\sqsubseteq_{\exists \forall} = \sqsubseteq_{\forall \exists \forall}$ and $\sqsubseteq_{\forall \exists} = \sqsubseteq_{\exists \forall \exists}$, which implies that only five essentially
 different inclusions exist, viz \sqsubseteq^i where $i = \text{empty}, \forall, \exists, \forall \exists, \exists \forall$.

4. PROTOTYPE PROOFS

In this section we will define the notion of 'prototype proof', which will
 play an important role in the sequel. Its main property is that every proof of
 some $\{p\}S\{q\}$ is a substitution instance of the prototype proof $\pi(S)$ corresponding
 to S . First we need an auxiliary concept.

4.1. DEFINITION. The class $IWP(\Sigma)$ (with typical elements S^*, S^{**}, \dots) of inter-
 polated while-programs is inductively defined by

$$S^* ::= S \mid \{p\}S^* \mid S^*\{p\} \mid \text{if } b \text{ then } S_1^* \text{ else } S_2^* \text{ fi} \mid \\ \text{while } b \text{ do } S^* \text{ od.}$$

Here $S \in WP(\Sigma)$. So the class of interpolated statements contains next to the usual
 statements also asserted statements and statements interlaced with assertions in
 an arbitrary way; but it contains also *proofs* of asserted statements. These will
 be singled out by means of the following extended proof rules.

4.2. DEFINITION. By means of the following axioms and extended proof rules we can
 derive proofs of asserted programs:

(1) *Assignment axiom scheme:* $\{p(t)\} \ x := t \ \{p\}$

(2) *Extended composition rule:*
$$\frac{\{p\}S_1^*\{r\} \quad \{r\}S_2^*\{q\}}{\{p\}S_1^*\{r\}S_2^*\{q\}}$$

(3) *Extended conditional rule:*

$$\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S_1^* \{q\} \quad \{p \wedge \neg b\} S_2^* \{q\}}{\{p\} \text{ if } b \text{ then } \{p \wedge b\} S_1^* \{q\} \text{ else } \{p \wedge \neg b\} S_2^* \{q\} \text{ fi } \{q\}}$$

(4) *Extended iteration rule:*
$$\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S^* \{p\}}{\{p\} \text{ while } b \text{ do } \{p \wedge b\} S^* \{p\} \text{ od } \{p \wedge b\}}$$

(5) *Extended consequence rule:*
$$\frac{p \rightarrow p_1 \ \{p_1\} S^* \{q_1\} \ q_1 \rightarrow q}{\{p\} \{p_1\} S^* \{q_1\} \{q\}}$$

4.3. DEFINITION AND NOTATION.

(i) Let $PR(\Sigma, T)$ be the class of proofs (interpolated programs) which can be derived using this axiom scheme and extended proof rules, such that in (5) only implications provable from T are used.

(ii) If $S^* \in IWP(\Sigma)$, then $\sigma(S^*)$ will denote the underlying program obtained by erasing all $\{p\}$ in S^* .

(iii) If $S^* \in PR(\Sigma, T)$, then $\kappa(S^*)$ will denote the set of implications $p \rightarrow p'$ used in the derivation of S^* . Note that these implications can be read off directly from S^* :

$$\kappa(S^*) = \{p \rightarrow p' \mid \{p\} \{p'\} \subseteq S^*\}.$$

(Here " \subseteq " denotes the relation of being contained as a 'subword'.)

(iv) If $S^* \in PR(\Sigma, T)$ and $S^* = \{p\} S_1^* \{q\}$, then $\text{pre}(S^*) = p$ and $\text{post}(S^*) = q$.

(v) Let $S^* \in PR(\Sigma, T)$. Then S^* is called a *reduced* proof, iff it contains no occurrence of a triple $\{p\} \{q\} \{r\}$.

(By the transitivity of \rightarrow , every proof may be supposed reduced, up to equivalence.)

(vi) Two interpolated programs S^* , S^{**} such that $\sigma(S^*) = \sigma(S^{**}) = S$ are called *matching* if at every place the same number of assertions occur in S^* , S^{**} .

(vii) Let $S^* = \text{--}\{p\}\text{--}$ be an interpolated statement containing $\{p\}$. Then $S^{**} = \text{--}\{p\} \{p\}\text{--}$ is called a *trivial expansion* of S^* .

In the following definition we will use a set of n -ary relation symbols $\{r_i \mid i \geq 0\}$. If $S^* \in IWP$ contains some of these r -symbols, $[S^*]_j$ will be the result of replacing each occurrence of r_i in S^* by $r_{(i,j)}$ where $(,) : \mathbb{N}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is the usual bijective pairing function. (This device merely serves to 'refresh' the r -symbols where necessary.)

4.4. DEFINITION.

(i) Let $S \in WP(\Sigma)$ involve the variables \vec{x} ($= x_1, \dots, x_n$). By induction on the structure of S we define $\pi'(S)$ as follows:

$$(1) \quad \pi'(x_i := t) = \{r_0(\vec{x}) \ [t/x_i] \} \ x_i := t \ \{r_0(\vec{x})\}.$$

$$(2) \quad \pi'(S_1; S_2) = [\pi'(S_1)]_0 \ [\pi'(S_2)]_1.$$

(That is, $\pi'(S_1)$ and $\pi'(S_2)$ are concatenated, without infix. Moreover, the r -symbols in $[\pi'(S_1)]_0$ are made distinct from those in $[\pi'(S_2)]_1$.)

$$(3) \quad \pi'(\underline{\text{if}} \ b \ \underline{\text{then}} \ S_1 \ \underline{\text{else}} \ S_2 \ \underline{\text{fi}}) =$$

$$\{r_0(\vec{x})\} \ \underline{\text{if}} \ b \ \underline{\text{then}} \ \{r_0(\vec{x}) \wedge b\} [\pi'(S_1)]_2 \ \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$$

$$\quad \underline{\text{else}} \ \{r_0(\vec{x}) \wedge \neg b\} [\pi'(S_2)]_3 \ \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$$

$$\quad \underline{\text{fi}} \ \{r_1(\vec{x})\}.$$

$$(4) \quad \pi'(\underline{\text{while}} \ b \ \underline{\text{do}} \ S \ \underline{\text{od}}) =$$

$$\{r_0(\vec{x})\} \ \underline{\text{while}} \ b \ \underline{\text{do}} \ \{r_0(\vec{x}) \wedge b\} \ S^* \ \underline{\text{od}} \ \{r_0(\vec{x}) \wedge \neg b\} \ \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$$

where $S^* = [\pi'(S)]_4$ and $r_0(\vec{x}) = \text{post}(S^*)$.

(ii) Now $\pi(S) = \{r_0(\vec{x})\} [\pi'(S)]_0 \ \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$.

$\pi(S)$ is called the *prototype proof* of S .

4.5. EXAMPLE. Let S be: $x_1 := 0;$

$x_2 := 1;$

while $x_2 > x_3$

do if $x_1 = 0$

then $x_3 := 0$

else $x_1 := x_2 + 1$

fi

od;

$x_1 := x_1 + x_2$

Then $\pi(S)$ is as follows. (The assertions to the right of the vertical bar are for use in Example 4.7.1.)

$\pi(S) =$	ϕ	
	←→	
$\{r_1(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{\text{true}\}$
$\{r_2(0, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{0=0\}$
$x_1 := 0$		
$\{r_2(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{x_1=0\}$
$\{r_3(x_1, 1, x_3)\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge 1=1\}$
$x_2 := 1$		
$\{r_3(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1\}$
$\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1\}$
<u>while</u> $x_2 > x_3$ <u>do</u>		
$\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3) \wedge x_2 > x_3\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_2 > x_3\}$
$\{r_4(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_2 > x_3\}$
<u>if</u> $x_1 = 0$ <u>then</u>		
$\{r_4(x_1, x_2, x_3) \wedge x_1 = 0\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_2 > x_3 \wedge x_1=0\}$
$\{r_5(x_1, x_2, 0)\}$		$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge 0=0\}$

$x_3 := 0$ $\{r_5(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ $\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ <u>else</u> $\{r_4(x_1, x_2, x_3) \wedge \neg x_1 = 0\}$ $\{r_7(x_2+1, x_2, x_3)\}$ $x_1 := x_2 + 1$ $\{r_7(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ $\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ <u>fi</u> $\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ <u>od</u> $\{r_6(x_1, x_2, x_3) \wedge \neg x_2 > x_3\}$ $\{r_8(x_1+x_2, x_2, x_3)\}$ $x_1 := x_1 + x_2$ $\{r_8(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$ $\{r_9(x_1, x_2, x_3)\}$	$\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3=0\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_2 > x_3 \wedge \neg x_1 = 0\}$ $\{x_2+1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3=0\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3=0\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1\}$ $\{x_1=0 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge \neg x_2 > x_3\}$ $\{x_1+x_2=1 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3 \geq 1\}$ $\{x_1=1 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3 \geq 1\}$ $\{x_1=1 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3 \geq 1\}$
---	--

4.6. DEFINITION. Let $S^* \in \text{IWP}(\Sigma)$ contain the n -ary relation symbol r , and let $p = p(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in L(\Sigma)$. (Note: p may contain other variables than those displayed.)

Then $\phi_r^p(S^*)$ is the result of replacing each $r(t_1, \dots, t_n)$, occurring in S^* , by $p(t_1, \dots, t_n)$. Likewise we define $\phi_{r_1, \dots, r_n}^{p_1, \dots, p_n}(S^*)$.

4.7. LEMMA. Let $S^* \in \text{PR}(\Sigma, T)$ be a reduced proof such that $\sigma(S^*) = S$. Then $\phi: \pi(S) \rightarrow S^*$ for some substitution ϕ as in Definition 4.6. (So every proof is an instance of the prototype proof.)

PROOF. Take S, S^* as in the lemma. We may suppose S^* and $\pi(S)$ are matching; otherwise only some trivial expansions (Definition 3.3) of S^* are required. Then we can construct by induction on the structure of S a substitution as required. This construction is entirely straightforward and routine; it will be left to the reader. \square

4.7.1. EXAMPLE. Let S be as in Example 4.5; we use the abbreviations

$$S'' = \text{if } x_1=0 \text{ then } x_3 := 0 \text{ else } x_1 := x_2 + 1 \text{ fi}$$

$$S' = \text{while } x_2 > x_3 \text{ do } S'' \text{ od}$$

$$S = x_1 := 0; x_2 := 1; S'; x_1 := x_1 + x_2.$$

Then the following proof of $\{\text{true}\}S\{x_1=1 \wedge x_2=1 \wedge x_3 \geq 1\}$, written as a column of asserted programs and implications, is a substitution instance of $\pi(S)$ as in Example 4.5, via the substitution ϕ displayed there (see the assertions to the right of the bar).

0.		<u>true</u> \rightarrow 0=1
	1.	{0=0}x ₁ := 0{x ₁ =0}
0,1:	2.	{ <u>true</u> }x ₁ := 0{x ₁ =0}
	3.	x ₁ =0 \rightarrow x ₁ =0 \wedge 1=1
2,3:	4.	{ <u>true</u> }x ₁ := 0{x ₁ =0 \wedge 1=1}
	5.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge 1=1}x ₂ := 1{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1}
4,5:	6.	{ <u>true</u> }x ₁ := 0; x ₂ := 1 {x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1}
	7.	x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ \wedge x ₁ =0 \rightarrow x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge 0=0
	8.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge 0=0}x ₃ := 0{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}
7,8:	9.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ \wedge x ₁ =0}x ₃ := 0{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}
	10.	{x ₂ +1=0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}x ₁ := x ₂ +1{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}
	11.	x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ \wedge x ₁ ≠0 \rightarrow x ₂ +1=0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0
10,11:	12.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ \wedge x ₁ ≠0}x ₁ := x ₂ +1{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}
9,12:	13.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ }S''{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0}
	14.	x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ =0 \rightarrow x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1
13,14:	15.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ >x ₃ }S''{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1}
	15:	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1}S'{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge \neg x ₂ >x ₃ }
6,16:	17.	{ <u>true</u> }x ₁ := 0; x ₂ := 1; S'{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge \neg x ₂ >x ₃ }
	18.	x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge \neg x ₂ >x ₃ \rightarrow x ₁ +x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ ≥1
	19.	{x ₁ +x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ ≥1}x ₁ := x ₁ +x ₂ {x ₁ =1 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ ≥1}
18,19:	20.	{x ₁ =0 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge \neg x ₂ >x ₃ }x ₁ := x ₁ +x ₂ {x ₁ =1 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ ≥1}
17,20:	21.	{ <u>true</u> }S{x ₁ =1 \wedge x ₂ =1 \wedge x ₃ ≥1}.

4.8. **PROPOSITION.** Let $\Sigma^0 = \Sigma \cup \Sigma_{\pi}(S)$ and $T^0 = T \cup \kappa(\pi(S))$. Then $(\Sigma^0, T^0) \cong (\Sigma, T)$.

PROOF. Take arbitrary p,q such that $HL(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{p\}S\{q\}$. (E.g. take q = true.) Let $\{p\}S^*\{q\} \in PR(\Sigma, T)$ be the corresponding proof; we may suppose it matches $\pi(S)$.

Now let $A \in Alg(\Sigma, T)$, so by soundness of HL we have $A \models \{p\}S\{q\}$. Further, it is not hard to see that the $r_i(\bar{x})$ can be interpreted in A just like the matching assertions in $\{p\}S^*\{q\}$.

Hence every $A \in Alg(\Sigma, T)$ can be expanded to an $A^0 \in Alg(\Sigma^0, T^0)$. So by the conservativity criterion 2.6, we have $(\Sigma^0, T^0) \cong (\Sigma, T)$. \square

5. PROOF SYSTEMS

Our interest is in formal criteria that imply program inclusion. The diagram described in the Introduction contains three such concepts: \sqsubseteq^{\forall} , $\sqsubseteq^{\exists\forall}$ and $\sqsubseteq^{\forall\exists}$ (in the notation of Remark 3.5). Now $\sqsubseteq^{\forall\exists}$ coincides with semantical program inclusion (3.4 plus 5.1) and therefore $\sqsubseteq^{\exists\forall}$ is a sufficient criterion (3.4(i)) as well as \sqsubseteq^{\forall} .

$HL(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ is a semicomputable relation (5.2). It constitutes a formal proof system of a conventional nature. \vdash is quite natural and suffices for many examples.

\vdash (\sqsubseteq^{\forall}) is not complete however (5.4(i)). The proof system \Vdash ($\sqsubseteq^{\forall\exists}$) provides a less effective but considerably stronger method (5.4(ii)). In fact \Vdash is also incomplete (5.3). Because $\sqsubseteq^{\exists\forall}$ can hardly be considered a formal proof method, we are left with the problem of finding useful extensions of \vdash and \Vdash . This seems to us to be a research topic of considerable importance.

5.1. PROPOSITION. *Cofinal inclusion implies semantical inclusion, i.e.*

$$\forall (\Sigma', T') \ni (\Sigma, T) \quad \exists (\Sigma'', T'') \ni (\Sigma', T') \quad S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2 \Rightarrow \\ \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2.$$

PROOF. Suppose $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \not\models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$. Choose $A \in \text{Alg}(\Sigma, T)$, $\vec{a}, \vec{b} \in A$ with $A \models S_1(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$ and $A \not\models S_2(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$. Let $k = |S_1(\vec{a})|$, i.e. $A \models \text{Comp}_{k, S_1}(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$. One obtains a signature Σ^0 by adding names \vec{a} and \vec{b} for \vec{a} and \vec{b} . Then let $\Sigma' = \Sigma^0 \cup \Sigma_{\pi(S_2)}$, $T' = T \cup \kappa(\pi(S_2))$. One proves $(\Sigma', T') \ni (\Sigma, T)$ just like Proposition 4.8. Moreover, let $\theta = \text{Comp}_{k, S_1}(\vec{a}) = \vec{b} \wedge \forall \vec{x} (\vec{x} = \vec{a} \rightarrow r_0(\vec{x})) \wedge \forall \vec{x} (r_1(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \neg \vec{x} = \vec{b})$. Here $r_0(x) = \text{pre}(\pi(S_2))$ and $r_1(x) = \text{post}(\pi(S_2))$ (see Definition 4.3). Then $(\Sigma', T' \cup \{\theta\})$ is consistent (a model is found by expanding A). Clearly

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma', T' \cup \{\theta\}) \{ \vec{x} = \vec{a} \} S_2 \{ \neg \vec{x} = \vec{b} \}; \text{ it follows that} \\ \text{HL}(\Sigma', T') \vdash \{ \theta \wedge \vec{x} = \vec{a} \} S_2 \{ \neg \vec{x} = \vec{b} \}.$$

Suppose $(\Sigma'', T'') \ni (\Sigma', T')$, then $T'' \cup \{\theta\}$ is consistent and

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'') \vdash \{ \theta \wedge \vec{x} = \vec{a} \} S_2 \{ \neg \vec{x} = \vec{b} \}.$$

Assume for a contradiction that $S_1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'')} S_2$ then:

$$\text{HL}(\Sigma'', T'') \vdash \{ \theta \wedge \vec{x} = \vec{a} \} S_1 \{ \neg \vec{x} = \vec{b} \}.$$

However in a model B of $T'' \cup \{\theta\}$ this asserted program is incorrect because $B \models \text{Comp}_{k, S_1}(\vec{a}) = \vec{b}$. \square

5.2. THEOREM. $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ and $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \equiv S_2$ as predicates of (S_1, S_2) are *semidecidable* in T .

PROOF. Let $\Sigma^0 = \Sigma \cup \Sigma_{\pi(S_2)}$ and $T^0 = T \cup \kappa(\pi(S_2))$. (Σ^0, T^0) is found effectively (Σ, T) . Now we claim that $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2 \iff \text{HL}(\Sigma^0, T^0) \vdash \{r_0(\vec{x})\} S_1 \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$, which implies the theorem because of the semidecidable character of Hoare's Logic.

To prove the claim: \Rightarrow is immediate. So assume $\text{HL}(\Sigma^0, T^0) \vdash \{r_0(\vec{x})\} S_1 \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$. Let $\{r_0(\vec{x})\} S_1^* \{r_1(\vec{x})\} \in \text{PR}(\Sigma^0, T^0)$. Given some $(\Sigma', T') \ni (\Sigma, T)$ assume $\text{HL}(\Sigma', T') \vdash \{p\} S_2 \{q\}$. Let $\{p\} S_2^* \{q\} \in \text{PR}(\Sigma', T')$ be the corresponding proof which we may assume matching with $\pi(S_2)$. By Lemma 4.7, $\{p\} S_2^* \{q\}$ is an instance of $\pi(S_2)$ via some substitution ϕ . Applying the substitution ϕ on $\{r_0(\vec{x})\} S_1^* \{r_1(\vec{x})\}$ we obtain a proof $\{p\} \phi(S_1^*) \{q\}$ in $\text{PR}(\Sigma', T')$. Consequently $\text{HL}(\Sigma', T') \vdash \{p\} S_1 \{q\}$. \square

Let $A = (\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$, $\Sigma = \Sigma_A$ and $T = T_A$. These notation conventions will hold until the end of this paper.

5.3. THEOREM. \vdash is incomplete. In fact there are $S_1, S_2 \in \text{WP}(\Sigma)$ with $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ but $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \not\models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$.

PROOF. An essentially straightforward verification shows that $\text{Alg}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ is a complete Π_2^0 predicate of (S_1, S_2) whereas $\text{HL}(\Sigma, T) \models S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ is a Σ_2^0 predicate of (S_1, S_2) . Recursion theory then tells that both predicates must differ. \square

5.4. PROPOSITION. Let S_1, S_2 be the following programs over Σ :

$$S_1 = y:=0; S' \text{ where } S' = \underline{\text{while}} \ x \neq 0 \ \underline{\text{do}} \ y:=Sy; \ x:=Px \ \underline{\text{od}} \\ S_2 = y:=x; \ x:=0$$

then (i) $HL(\Sigma, T) \not\vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ but (ii) $HL(\Sigma, T) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$.

PROOF. (i) $S_1 \not\sqsubseteq_{HL(\Sigma, T)} S_2$ because

$$(1) \quad HL(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{x=z\}S_2\{x=0 \wedge y=z\}$$

$$(2) \quad HL(\Sigma, T) \not\vdash \{x=z\}S_1\{x=0 \wedge y=z\}.$$

Here (2) requires a proof: suppose not (2), then

$$HL(\Sigma, T) \vdash \{x=z \wedge y=0\}S_1\{x=0 \wedge y=z\}.$$

Hence there must be an invariant $r(x, y, z)$ such that $T \vdash \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \wedge \phi_3$ where

$$\phi_1 = x=z \wedge y=0 \rightarrow r(x, y, z)$$

$$\phi_2 = \exists x', y' [x' \neq 0 \wedge x = Px' \wedge y = Sy' \wedge r(x', y', z)] \rightarrow r(x, y, z)$$

$$\phi_3 = x=0 \wedge r(x, y, z) \rightarrow y=z.$$

Also $A \models \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \wedge \phi_3$. However, a simple proof shows then that $A \models r(a, b, c) \iff a+b=c$, in contradiction with the non-definability of $+$ in A .

(ii). Let $A' = (N, 0, S, P, +)$. Because (Σ, T) is complete, we have $(\Sigma_{A'}, T_{A'}) \models (\Sigma, T)$. Using the method of prototype proofs, $HL(\Sigma_{A'}, T_{A'}) \vdash S_1 \sqsubseteq S_2$ is established as follows: consider $\pi(S_2)$, this is

$$\{r_0(x, y)\}\{r_1(x, x)\} \quad y:=x \quad \{r_1(x, y)\}\{r_2(0, y)\} \quad x:=0 \quad \{r_2(x, y)\}\{r_3(x, y)\}.$$

So we have to find a proof of $\{r_0(x, y)\} S_1 \{r_3(x, y)\}$ in the theory

$$\begin{aligned} T_{A'} \cup \{ & r_0(x, y) \rightarrow r_1(x, x), \\ & r_1(x, y) \rightarrow r_2(0, y), \\ & r_2(x, y) \rightarrow r_3(x, y) \}. \end{aligned}$$

This is indeed possible:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{r_0(x, y)\}\{r_1(x, x)\}\{r_2(0, x)\}\{r_3(0, x)\} \\ y:=0 & \\ & \{r_3(0, x) \wedge y=0\} \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge x=x_0 \wedge y=0]\} \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge x+y=x_0]\} \\ \text{while } x \neq 0 \text{ do} & \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge x+y=x_0 \wedge x \neq 0]\} \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge Px+Sy=x_0 \wedge x \neq 0]\} \\ y:=Sy & \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge Px+y=x_0 \wedge x \neq 0]\} \\ x:=Px & \\ & \{\exists x_0[r_3(0, x_0) \wedge x+y=x_0]\} \end{aligned}$$

od

$$\{\exists x_0 [r_3(0, x_0) \wedge x+y=x_0] \wedge x=0\}$$

$$\{\exists x_0 [r_3(0, x_0) \wedge y=x_0 \wedge x=0]\}$$

$$\{r_3(x, y)\}.$$

REFERENCES.

- [1] Back, R.J., Correctness preserving program refinements: proof theory and applications, Mathematical Centre Tracts 131, Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam, 1980.
- [2] De Bakker, J.W., Recursive procedures, Mathematical Centre Tracts 24, Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam, 1973.
- [3] De Bakker, J.W., Mathematical theory of program correctness, Prentice-Hall International, London, 1980.
- [4] Bergstra, J.A. & J.W. Klop, Proving program inclusion using Hoare's logic, Mathematical Centre, Department of Computer Science, Research Report IW 176, Amsterdam 1981.
- [5] Bergstra, J.A. & J. Terlouw, A characterization of program equivalence in terms of Hoare's logic, Proceedings of the G.I. Jahrestagung München 1981, Springer LNCS 123.
- [6] Bergstra, J.A. & J.V. Tucker, Expressiveness and the completeness of Hoare's logic, Mathematical Centre, Department of Computer Science Research Report IW 149, Amsterdam, 1980. To appear in JCSS.
- [7] Bergstra, J.A. & J.V. Tucker, Two theorems about the completeness of Hoare's logic, Mathematical Centre, Department of Computer Science Research Report IW 165, Amsterdam, 1981.
- [8] Boolos, G.S. & R.C. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, Cambridge University Press (1974, 1980).
- [9] Cousineau, G. & P. Enjalbert, Program equivalence and provability, Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 1979, Proc. 8th Symp., Olomouc (Czechoslovakia), Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science 74, p.237-245.
- [10] Guessarian, I., Algebraic Semantics, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science 99, 1981.
- [11] Harel, D., A. Pnueli & J. Stavi, A complete axiom system for proving deductions about recursive programs, in Proc. 9th ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, Boulder, 1977.
- [12] Hemerik, C., Relaties tussen taaldefinitie en taalimplementatie, in Colloquium Capita Implementatie van Programmeertalen, J.C. van Vliet (red.), MC Syllabus 42, Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam 1980.
- [13] Manna, Z., Mathematical theory of computation, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.
- [14] Meyer, A.R. & J.Y. Halpern, Axiomatic definitions of programming languages. A theoretical assessment, Proceedings 7th ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, ACM, New York, 1980, p.203-212.
- [15] Monk, J.D., Mathematical Logic, Springer-Verlag (1976).
- [16] Russell, B., Correctness of the compiling process based on axiomatic semantics, Acta Informatica 14, p.1-20, 1980.
- [17] Shoenfield, J., Mathematical Logic, Reading, Addison-Wesley (1967).

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Lauer: You have mostly said that your method is related to stepwise refinement. And I was wandering how your inclusion relation relates to bottom-up developments of programs. Because I found, particularly with relation to deadlock freeness that it is often the case that program fragments may involve deadlock. They are incorrect, if you like, and only their ultimate combination yields the correct program.

Bergstra: I think your kind of problems are just too complex for these methods.

Lauer: In other words: it seems to be the case in some developments of programs that you cannot always proceed from correct programs to correct programs, but you have to go from incorrect to correct, combined programs.

Bergstra: Of course, this business has one feature. And that is that modularity gets lost, somehow. Here (ϕ) you see that this condition is one big thing. It is not really split up into subparts. So, if that is the case, then the correctness of the programs is the end-effect of the whole thing, and it has no modular structure. But that doesn't very much prove that it is suitable for that situation.

Apt: I would like to know: what is in fact the essential difference between this method of proving program inclusion and the one which was originally suggested by de Bakker and Scott in '69? The problem is that, in fact, this method is not modular as you stated, and I even think is more difficult to use. And therefore I do not see any particular advantage of introducing this method.

Bergstra: Yes well ... This is just a quite different analysis, and I am based on the 1st order semantics, and on these transformations of proofs. It may well be the case that it is essentially the same, but I have never been informed about that. de Bakker says he doesn't know; somehow — it may still be true, but nevertheless. (Laughter)

de Bakker: I just said: I don't know.